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CASES NOTED
INSURANCE AGAINST THE ASSESSMENT OF
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Plaintiff obtained a 15,000 dollar judgment against the insured. Of
this amount, 12,000 dollars was awarded as compensatory damages and
3,000 dollars was for punitive damages. The insurer paid the com-
pensatory damages, but refused to pay the amount awarded for punitive
damages, contending that the insurance contract did not cover liability
for punitive damages. The plaintiff brought an action for a declaratory
decree seeking a construction of the insurance contract.' The lower court
granted the insurance company's motion for a summary final decree. On
appeal to the Second District Court of Appeals, held, affirmed: it is
violative of the public policy of Florida to require an insuror to pay
punitive damages awarded against its insured. Nicholson v. American
Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 177 So.2d 52 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
Compensatory damages, as distinguished from punitive damages,
are awarded in both intentional and unintentional tort actions.2 The
assessment of punitive damages, on the other hand, has been limited
primarily to intentional tort actions.3 However, courts are assessing
punitive damages in an increasing number of instances where the defen-
dant's conduct amounts to something more than mere negligence.'
The ordinary automobile liability insurance policy covers an insured
1. The court observed that the policy in question provided generally that the insuror
was to pay "all sums which the insured shall legally become obligated to pay as damages."
Nicholson v. American Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 177 So.2d 52, 53 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
The standard automobile liability policy provides as follows: "To pay on behalf of
the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages
because of bodily injury, . . . caused by accident . . . arising out of the . . . use of the
automobile." 7 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4311 (1962).
2. Since compensatory damages are "to put the injured party in the same position
(condition) in which he would have been if the tort had not been committed . .. " OLEcK,
DAMAGES TO PERSONS AND PROPERTY § 80 (1961), it necessarily follows that compensatory
damages are properly awarded in both intentional and unintentional torts.
3. The reason for this limited application is that the wrongful act complained of must
be accompanied by circumstances of aggravation, such as wantonness, maliciousness or
wilfulness, and such circumstances occur with more frequency in the intentional tort area.
The basis for this conclusion can be found by an examination of the torts in which punitive
damages are most often assessed. Punitive damages are awarded frequently in such actions
as false arrest or imprisonment, fraud and deceit, libel or slander and seduction, all of
which are considered intentional torts. See generally 22 AM. JUR. 2d, Damages § 243 (1965).
4. Professor Appelman supports this conclusion by stating:
When so many states have guest statutes in which the test of liability is made
to depend upon wilful and wanton conduct, or when courts, in an effort to get away
from contributory negligence of the plaintiff, permit a jury to find a defendant
guilty of wilful and wanton conduct where the acts would clearly not fall within
the common law definition of those terms . . . . 7 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 4312 (1962).
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for damages assessed against him as a result of unintentional conduct.!
Intentional conduct is almost always excluded from the coverage of the
insurance contract. This exclusion of intentional conduct may either be
the result of an express clause in the policy,' or it may follow from a
construction of the standard contract term "caused by accident" as not
extending coverage to damages assessed for intentionally inflicted injuries.'
A problem arises, as in the instant case, when punitive damages are
awarded in that "grey area" of gross, wanton or reckless negligence which
borders on, but is generally considered to be less than," intentional con-
duct. Although there has been some criticism9 of this position, almost all
jurisdictions allow the assessment of punitive damages in this class of
cases.'0 Professor McCormick has appropriately expressed the dominant
view in these words: "Exemplary damages are assessed for the avowed
purpose of visiting a punishment upon the defendant and not as a measure
of any loss or detriment of the plaintiff."" Consistent with this position,
most legal writers have advocated that public policy requires exclusion
of punitive damages from liability insurance coverage when they are
awarded against the tortfeasor responsible for the damage-otherwise,
the wrongdoer is not punished.' 2
The majority of jurisdictions which have been confronted with this
problem have been able to avoid the public policy question by resting
5. Rothman v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., 134 Ohio St. 241, 16 N.E.2d 417 (1938).
The standard automobile liability policy term "accident" has been held to be a more
comprehensive term than "negligence." The policy extends coverage to claims based on the
aggravated forms of negligence, such as gross negligence, recklessness, or wantonness. E.g.,
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 734
(1935)'; Sheehan v. Goriansky, 321 Mass. 200, 72 N.E.2d 538 (1947). See generally annot.,
173 A.L.R. 503 (1948).
6. Hill v. Standard Mut. Cas. Co., 110 F.2d 1001 (7th Cir. 1940).
7. E.g., Huntington Cab Co. v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 155 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1946);
Sontag v. Galer, 279 Mass. 309, 181 N.E. 182 (1932) ; Weis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 242 Minn. 141, 64 N.W.2d 366 (1954); Messersmith v. American Fid. Co., 232 N.Y. 161,
133 N.E. 432 (1921) ; Anton v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 117 Vt. 300, 91 A.2d 697 (1952).
8. For a general discussion, see Comment, Insurer's Liability for Punitive Damages,
14 Mo. L. REV. 175 (1949), wherein the author discusses some of the problems attendant
upon this area of the law.
9. There is, of course, much controversy over the merits and constitutionality of the
existence of "civil punishment" in our legal system. The argument is that civil damages
should indemnify the plaintiff and not punish the defendant. See Morris, Punitive
Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1173 (1931); Aldridge, The Indiana Doctrine of
Exemplary Damages and Double Jeopardy, 20 IND. L.J. 123 (1945); Comment, 7 MA.ii
L.Q. 517 (1953).
10. McCoRiuicx, DAMAGES § 78 (1935). But see Boot Mills v. Boston & M.R.R., 218
Mass. 582, 106 N.E. 680 (1914) (However, punitive damages are allowed under the Massa-
chusetts wrongful death statute.); Vincent v. Morgan's La. & Tex. R.R. & Steamship Co.,
140 La. 1027, 74 So. 541 (1917); Riewe v. McCormick, 11 Neb. 261, 9 N.W. 88 (1881);
Wilson v. Sun Pub. Co., 85 Wash. 503, 148 Pac. 774 (1915).
11. McCoRmIcx, DAMAGES § 77 (1935).
12. See OLECK, DAMAGES TO PERSONS AND PROPERTY § 275 (1961); 36 U. COLO. L. REV.
285 (1964); Logan, Punitive Damages in Automobile Cases, 1961 INs. L.J. 27; contra, 63
CoLUM. L. REV. 944 (1963).
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their decisions on other grounds. 8 Some of these cases involved factual
situations in which the insured himself was not the tortfeasor."4 When this
occurs, the courts are able to allow recovery for punitive damages assessed
against the insured since the insured's conduct was not the wrongful act
on which the punitive damages were predicated. In still other cases, the
ratio decidendi was predicated not upon the public policy question, but
rather upon the construction of local statutory provisions. 5
Some jurisdictions do not require that the damages awarded against
a defendant be designated as either punitive or compensatory; a "lump-
sum" judgment is allowed.1" Insurance companies have attempted to
challenge these "lump-sum" judgments by contending that whatever
portion may be an award for punitive damages is not recoverable against
the insurer. However, the courts have failed to disturb such awards, even
though they are primarily composed of punitive damages.
The more recent decisions that have considered the problem of
indemnification by the insurer for punitive damages assessed against the
insured for his unintentional torts, have all been based on public policy ra-
tionales, but have reached apparent dichotomous results. Those courts
which deny recovery from the insurer have adopted the theory that it
would be against "public policy" to allow indemnification for such
13. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Thornton, 244 F.2d 823
(4th Cir. 1957) ; General cas. Co. v. Woodby, 238 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1956) ; New Amsterdam
Cas. Co. v. Jones, 135 F.2d 191 (6th Cir. 1943); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75
F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 734 (1935); Capital Motor Lines v. Loring,
238 Ala. 260, 189 So. 897 (1939); American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Werfel, 230 Ala. 552, 162
So. 103 (1935); Tedesco v. Maryland Cas. Co., 127 -Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941).
14. General Cas. Co. v. Woodby, 238 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1956); New Amsterdam Cas.
Co. v. Jones, 135 F.2d 191 (6th Cir. 1943); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75
F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 734 (1935).
15. For instance, in the leading case of Tedesco v. Maryland Cas. Co., 127 Conn. 533,
18 A.2d 357 (1941), the Connecticut statute involved authorized double or treble damages
in cases of willful violations of the motor vehicle law. The court construed this statute to be
a penalty in nature and distinguished "punitive damages" from such a penalty. The court
denied recovery of the penalty from the insurer, but indicated that if it were punitive
damages, recovery would be granted.
In two Alabama cases decided under the Alabama wrongful death statute, the insurer
was held liable for the full amount assessed, notwithstanding the fact that the statute spoke
in terms of punitive damages. Neither of the cases predicated their holdings upon public
policy because punitive damages under the statute are viewed as compensatory in nature.
American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Werfel, 230 Ala. 552, 162 So. 103 (1935); Capital Motor
Lines v. Loring, 238 Ala. 260, 189 So. 897 (1939). But see Employers Ins. Co. v. Brock, 233
Ala. 551, 172 So. 671 (1937) (recovery allowed against the insurer, but not under the
Alabama wrongful death statute).
16. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmer's Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Thornton, 244 F.2d
823 (4th Cir. 1957); Morrell v. LaLonde, 45 R.I. 112, 120 At. 435 (1923).
17. Allowing recovery: Carroway v. Johnson, 139 S.E.2d 908 (S.C. 1965); Lazenby v.
Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 383 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1964). Denying recovery: Northwestern




conduct.I8 The leading case supporting this position is Northwestern Nat'l
Cas. Co. v. McNulty. 9
The majority in McNulty specifically recognized that none of the
prior cases dealing with the question of indemnification by an insurer for
the assessment of punitive damages against its insured had discussed the
"more important ... question of public policy."2 After concluding that
Florida's position relative to the purpose of punitive damages was con-
sistent with themajority of jurisdictions, i.e., to punish,2' the federal court
applied the Florida law and stated:
It is not disputed that insurance against criminal fines or penal-
ties would be void as violative of public policy. The same public
policy should invalidate any contract of insurance against the
civil punishment that punitive damages represent.
22
Discussing the underlying public policy objection to insurance against
punishment, Judge Wisdom poignantly stated:
The argument that insurance against punitive damages would
contravene public policy is sometimes said to rest on the doctrine
that 'no one shall be permitted to take advantage of his own
wrong.' . . . In such cases the public policy against coverage is
not so much to prevent encouragement of wrong-doing by ob-
structing the hopes of profit; it is rather to make effective the
discouragement of wrong-doing by the imposition of punishment.
Where a person is able to insure himself against punishment he
gains a freedom of misconduct inconsistent with the establish-
ment of sanctions against such misconduct.23
The court's holding was reached without considering the terms of the
insurance contract, but, the court stated that even if punitive damages
were specifically provided for in the contract, the provision for such
damages would be void.24
Exemplary of those courts which reach a result diametrically opposed
to McNulty, by allowing indemnification for the assessment of punitive
damages, is Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co.25 In Lazenby,
18. Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962),; CruU v.
Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. 1964).
19. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962) (applying Florida law).
20. Id. at 436.
21. Ibid.
22. Id. at 440.
23. Ibid.
24. Id. at 434.
25. Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 383 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1964). The South
Carolina Supreme Court recently adopted the view that it was not against the public policy
of that state to insure against punitive damages and that to construe the policy in any
other way would be violative of the parties' rights under a voluntary contractual relation-
ship. Carroway v. Johnson, 139 S.E.2d 908 (S.C. 1965).
1965]
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the court was confronted with an almost identical set of facts. The court
recognized that the penal nature of the doctrine of punitive damages in
Tennessee is similar to that of Florida, but stated that "We ... are not
able to agree [that] the closing of the insurance market, on the payment
of punitive damages, to such drivers would necessarily accomplish the
result of deterring them in their wrongful conduct." 6
The Lazenby court clearly recognized and accepted the punishment
purpose of punitive damages.27 However, Lazenby attempted to support
its result on the basis that the deterrent aspect of punitive damages is in
fact nonexistent.2" The inconsistency of this reasoning is evidenced in
part, by what this writer believes was the real holding of the case. In
Lazenby the court departed from the merits of the problem and issued a
mandate, implicit in its result, to insurance companies to the effect that:
If change is to be made in the provisions of this standard
policy and the coverage afforded thereby, it should be made in
the office of the Commissioner and not by the Court. 9
In this respect, the dichotomous position between McNulty and Lazenby
may be illusory, although the language of the majority of the Lazenby
court obscured the holding by stating that "the average policy holder
reading . . . [the standard liability policy] would expect to be protected
against all claims, not intentionally inflicted.""0
In the instant case,8' the Second District Court of Appeals, after
considering the Fifth Circuit's application of Florida law in McNulty,
agreed "that as a matter of public policy punitive damages in this state
are based on a theory inconsistent with their coverage by liability
insurance."82 Punitive damages had been previously defined by the Florida
Supreme Court as those damages which "blend together the interests of
society and of the aggrieved individual, and are not only a recompense to
the sufferer but a punishment to the offender and an example to the com-
munity."3 In construing this definition, the court stated: "While this
definition may seem to lend credence to the belief that punitive damages
also compensate plaintiff for his injuries, we find their overriding purpose
to be punishment."84 After basing its decision on "public policy," the
court concluded that a construction of the insurance contract would not
26. Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 383 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tenn. 1964).
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid. No other conclusion can be drawn by this writer based on the court's
language, which is to the effect that punitive damages would not deter socially irresponsible
drivers from reckless conduct.
29. Id. at 8 (concurring opinion).
30. Id. at 5.
31. Nicholson v. American Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 177 So.2d 52 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
32. Id. at 53.
33. Smith v. Bagwell, 19 Fla. 117, 121 (1882).
34. Nicholson v. American Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 177 So.2d 52, 54 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
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be necessary and in closing remarked: "We believe that a person has no
right to expect the law to allow him to place responsibility for his reckless
and wanton actions on someone else.
' 3 5
The soundness of the decision in the instant case was enhanced by
the analysis of Judge Shannon, who perceptively distinguished those
decisions in which insurance companies have been held liable for puni-
tive damages. He stated:
In these cases, the courts have construed the contracts against
the drafting party and found the wording broad enough to
encompass punitive damages. We base our decision on public
policy, and therefore the question of interpretation is not
reached. 6
It is submitted that Judge Shannon's approach to the problem
settles the question. His reconciliation of Lazenby upon contract grounds
removes Lazenby from a position in direct opposition to the majority.
Such a result clearly comports with both the public policy surrounding
punitive damages and the possibilities of indemnification for those
damages.
BARRY KUTUN
RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DURING
POLICE INTERROGATION
The defendant was arrested in connection with the murder of a store-
keeper. After police investigators interrogated him for several hours at
a police station, he admitted complicity in the murder. He made no request
for the assistance of counsel at any time during police questioning. The
trial court allowed the incriminating statements to be introduced into
evidence over the defendant's objection that such introduction would
result in a denial of due process of law because he was interrogated with-
out benefit of the advice of counsel.' On direct appeal to the Supreme
Court of Florida, held, affirmed: the sixth amendment to the federal
constitution, as made obligatory upon the states by the fourteenth amend-
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
1. The defendant raised the issue of the fifth amendment right against self-incrimina-
tion. However, this note will be confined to the sixth amendment right-to-counsel clause as
it applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment because the Supreme Court of the
United States has recently based its holdings in confession cases on that clause rather than
upon consideration of whether a confession can be voluntarily made when a suspect is
not advised of his right to remain silent.
For a cogent argument that the fifth amendment is the only appropriate clause to be
applied to confessions, see Elsen & Enker, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States
& Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REv. 47, 57-58 (1965).
